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ABSTRACT  
 
It is claimed that transport infrastructure projects have network effects 
which are not taken into account in the appraisal of these projects. This 
paper reviews the concept of network effects, relates this to transport 
appraisal practice, and links to the concept of ‘total economic impact’. The 
limitations of transport modelling and appraisal in estimating total 
economic impact are reviewed. Good quality appraisals should be capable 
of picking up relevant network effects in the transport market, but the state 
of the art remains limited on the linkages between transport and the wider 
economy. 
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  11 INTRODUCTION 
 
European policymakers have been interested for some years now in 
network effects - see, for example Turró (1999), van Exel et al (2002), and 
Pearman et al (2003). There is a widely-held belief among policymakers 
that transport infrastructure projects give rise to network effects which are 
not taken into account in the appraisal of these projects. Such effects 
could be an important source of benefits from the implementation of the 
European Commission’s transport sector policy as set out in ‘European 
Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide’ (EC, 2001). 
 
Many of the initiatives specified in ‘Time to Decide’ are about developing 
the ‘network’ aspects of the TEN-T (Trans-European Transport Networks). 
For example, the rail networks of Spain and Portugal currently operate on 
a different gauge of track from the rest of Europe. One of the initiatives at 
the European level is to bring about a harmonisation of track gauge, so 
creating an interoperable international network. Another set of initiatives 
relates to border crossings. The High Level Group report on the TEN-T 
(2003) identified and gave top priority to at least 15 infrastructure projects 
which will improve border crossings between countries in the EU15 and 
the new member states. Other ‘network’ initiatives in Europe include the 
GALILEO satellite navigation project, which will also facilitate electronic 
charging using a common technology across the European road network, 
and the creation of a multi-modal logistics centre in Poland linking to the 
Russian rail network (also on a different gauge). ‘Time to Decide’ also 
  2outlines one completely new network – the so-called ‘motorways of the 
sea’. 
 
There is no doubt that, when implemented, these initiatives will change the 
physical network, and the pattern of use made of it. But the question is – 
what exactly are network effects? Are they simply the economist’s user 
benefits translated into politicians’ language? Or are they something more 
than that? How are they potentially and actually captured in models of the 
transport and economic system? What is the state of the art and how 
significant are network effects in transport? This is the agenda for this 
paper. 
 
2  NETWORK EFFECTS FROM AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
Transport infrastructure has a physical presence in the form of roads, 
inland waterways, airports and so on. However, transport networks are not 
always defined by the existence of physical infrastructure: ships and 
aircraft use a set of routes largely without physical markings. Conceptually, 
a transport network is simply an interconnected set of links and nodes. 
The European transport network is not, however, a single homogenous 
entity. It is a combination of modal networks within which there are 
hierarchies such as national, regional and local roads. Management of this 
large and complex network is devolved so that there can be conflicts 
between local and global optimisation within modes, between modes and 
  3between countries. As others have shown, there can be uncounted, 
uncosted effects in related markets (Roy,1995;Van Exel et al.,2002). 
 
Consider as a starting point an old-style single mode, fixed matrix 
appraisal of a transport scheme in a tightly drawn study area with all traffic 
growth created by exogenous changes in income and fuel prices. For 
example, this was the technology of appraisal exemplified by the COBA 
Manual in the UK in the 1980s. It gives a measure of scheme benefits 
under a restrictive set of conditions and represents  our reference case. 
 
Relative to this form of appraisal, it is possible to identify three sorts of 
interactions which should ideally be taken into account. Firstly, there are 
interactions with the rest of the transport system. There may, for example, 
be  behavioural response, such as changes in destination, invalidating the 
fixed matrix assumption. There may be effects outside the study area, or 
on other modes. The effects may spill across national boundaries. A more 
fully specified transport model would be capable in principle of capturing 
these effects. 
 
Secondly, there are interactions between transport and the environment. 
These impacts are not discussed further here, not because they are 
unimportant, but because their status as technological externalities is well 
understood. 
 
  4Thirdly, there are interactions between transport and the economy. 
Transport changes bring about accessibility changes which in turn 
stimulate land development, and ultimately changes in the pattern of 
outputs, prices and wages. Transport is an intermediate good so the 
linkages back to the labour and land markets and forward to the goods 
and services markets are highly relevant to transport pricing and 
investment policies. 
 
Transport is not unique; there are many interactions in the economic 
system. Every time a new good is created, demand is abstracted from 
competing goods. Under conditions of constant returns to scale – that is, 
under competitive conditions – there are no second round consequences 
for economic welfare. Demand falls, output adjusts and prices for 
substitutes and costs remain unchanged. 
 
Suppose, however, that markets are not subject to constant returns. Then 
changes in transport demand will have consequences for unit costs and/or 
prices in transport and related markets. We define network effects as the 
second round reverberations on costs and prices in related markets as a 
result of a transport improvement. These may be: 
 
-  Effects in other parts of the transport system, which we label 
transport network effects 
  5-  Effects in the economic sectors which transport connects by 
forward and backward linkages – transport/economy network 
effects. 
 
Transport is of course far from the only sector to which this sort of 
argument applies. Others include telecommunication networks, 
broadcasting and the internet, and networks to supply electricity, gas and 
water (see Shy, 2001 for an overview). All these network goods have one 
or more of the following characteristics:- 
 
(i)  Sunk costs and economies of scope/density on the supply side, and 
specifically so-called sub-additivity in production (e.g. Baumol, 
Panzar and Willig, 1982; Jara-Diaz, 2000). 
 
(ii)  Congestibility (see e.g. Mayer and Sinai, 2003). The effects of 
constrained capacity and growing demand are widespread in network 
industries. 
 
(iii)  Positive consumption externalities whereby an individual’s valuation 
of a good (e.g. phone service) is dependent in part on the number of 
other users attached to the network (see Liebowitz and Margolis, 
1998). This characteristic is directly relevant for so-called ‘two-way’ 
networks such as transport, telecommunications and the internet, 
where the purpose of the connection is largely to interact with people 
or businesses at the other end of the connection. For ‘one-way’ 
  6networks such as gas or electricity supply, the consumer is 
concerned only with their own consumption of the network good, and 
will experience consumption externalities only indirectly if increasing 
numbers of other consumers leads the network provider to increase 
the varieties or spatial availability of service on offer. 
 
These characteristics are what cause the second round effects on costs 
and prices which may reinforce or dampen the primary effect of the 
investment project. 
 
On the supply side - sunk costs and economies of scale/ 
scope/density 
 
The properties of certain types of transport infrastructure and services 
imply that capacity-enhancing investment will result in a reduction of unit 
costs (a network effect). Classic examples include railway infrastructure 
and airline operations. A train lengthening programme which caters for a 
doubling of demand between two points does not require a doubling of all 
inputs, due to economies of density of the rail network. Hub and spoke 
operations, and the use of as large a vehicle as possible, are also classic 
devices for achieving economies of density and scale, whether in airlines, 
railways or bus networks. Again, infrastructure improvements may enable 
transport operators to increase the number of routes offered or 
destinations served. Economies of scope imply that the average costs per 
trip fall as the number of products (routes) offered increases. So, 
  7investment in a complementary part of the network will feed additional 
traffic lowering unit costs; conversely investment in a competing network 
will abstract traffic, reducing density and raising unit costs. 
 
There is substantial quantitative evidence that economies of scale, scope 
and density exist within transport networks, particularly rail and air 
networks (see e.g. Winston, 1985; Jara-Díaz, 1988; Pels and Rietveld, 
2000; Jara-Díaz and Basso, 2003). Of course it is not just the transport 
market that is subject to such economies. The New Economic Geography 
literature (Krugman, 1991) emphasises that interactions between the 
transport network and the wider economy allow businesses to rationalise 
and exploit economies of scale thereby lowering unit costs. Such a change 
can be driven by a change in transport supply. We therefore see that 
economies of scale, scope and density in transport using sectors of the 
wider economy (e.g. manufacturing) are also a source of network effects. 
 
Supply-demand interaction - congestibility 
 
A classic example of supply-demand interaction is traffic congestion. 
Congestion on one transport route or mode affects journey times, costs 
and demand for other routes or modes. This is because demand is 
displaced from the congested routes onto those that are less congested. 
An investment that alleviates congestion on one route will therefore affect 
the demands and costs of using alternative options. Traffic congestion and 
  8the potential for infrastructure or services to become congested or 
overcrowded are therefore sources of transport network effects. 
 
On the demand side – positive consumption externalities 
 
Transport is a derived demand. That is the demand to travel stems from 
the demand to engage in a certain activity: attend work, meet friends, 
meet to conduct business, buy products, sell products, and so on. 
Transport is therefore all about connecting people and 
production/consumption systems in some form of economic linkage. We 
contend that changes in the potential number of economic linkages that 
can be formed (e.g. through a transport infrastructure investment) will lead 
to positive consumption externalities and these are a source of network 
effect. 
 
As a transport network is expanded or is improved more linkage 
opportunities become available at a given price (generalised cost). This 
can be seen in Figure 1 in the linkage opportunities offered by an airline as 
it increases the number of its routes from one to 20, operated out of a 
single hub airport. As the number of routes increases by one (from n to 
n+1), the number of opportunities for individuals or firms to link together 
increases by n+1.  
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FIGURE 1: INCREASING LINKAGE OPPORTUNITIES WITH NETWORK 
EXPANSION IN A HUB AND SPOKE NETWORK 
 
In a more dramatic case, if two unconnected networks are connected by a 
‘missing link’ across a geographical or political boundary, there could be a 
sudden large increase in the number of linkage opportunities that become 
available. For example, before ‘Network D’ (with D destinations) and 
‘Network E’ (with E destinations) are connected the total number of linkage 
opportunities is only: 
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By connecting the two networks the number of opportunities increases to: 
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The potential power of this argument is obvious: if a trading block of 20 
cities of over 1 million people is combined with another trading block of 10 
cities, the number of opportunities to form economic linkages increases by 
80 per cent. There are of course questions about what proportion of output 
is actually traded that is capable of overcoming the transport cost barrier. 
However, where the historical barrier has been artificial (e.g. political) 
rather than economic, one would expect improved transport infrastructure 
to act as a stimulus to integration of product and factor markets. 
 
Setting this characteristic of linkage opportunities into an economic 
context: from the perspective of the individual or firm, the more 
opportunities that exist the better. Drawing on analyses developed within 
the context of telephone networks the utility of each individual consumer 
increases with the number of other consumers connected to the network. 
Within a transport context this can be expressed as an indirect utility 
function where instead of consumers we are interested in linkage 
opportunities to meet people or to produce/consume: 
 
  11U = U (j, -GC) 
where    j is the vector of destinations (linkages) 
accessible at the vector of prices (generalised 
costs) GC. 
 
As utility is related to the number of opportunities for linkages to be made, 
if there is an exponential increase in those opportunities, as occurs with a 
network expansion (as in the hub and spoke example and the two trading 
block example), then there can be a significant increase in utility. Benefits 
of network expansion occur not only to those individuals newly connected 
to the network, but also to the large number of individuals who are already 
connected, since their opportunities for travel and trade will also expand. 
Such incidental (external) benefits are termed ‘consumption externalities’. 
Consumption externalities give rise to thicker labour markets, better 
producer-supplier linkages and knowledge spillovers – which are all forms 
of agglomeration economies. 
 
3  CAPTURING NETWORK EFFECTS IN TRANSPORT-ECONOMY 
MODELS 
 
3.1  From transport initiative to network effect 
 
We have already set out the economic stimuli that generate network 
effects: economies of scale, scope and density and congestion on the 
supply side and consumption externalities - the opportunities to change or 
  12create additional economic linkages - on the demand side. Such stimuli 
need to be reflected in the modelling system if the scale and sign of 
network effects are to be forecast robustly. 
 
At first glance, these stimuli do not appear to relate particularly well to 
existing methods used to model transport project impacts, particularly on 
the demand side. For example what do gravity models, logit models and 
Wardrop’s Users’ Equilibrium have in common with ‘consumption 
externalities’ and ‘economic linkages’? In fact, such modelling approaches 
are conceptually consistent with the economic specification of network 
effects. This is because it is the utility maximising behaviour of individuals 
and the profit maximising behaviour of firms that link the economic causes 
of network effects to their manifestation on transport networks and within 
the economy. Utility and profit maximising behaviour also underpin the 
vast majority of transport and economy models, as most models include 
some form of function that minimises generalised cost. Figure 2 shows the 
transport and economy system, and the dynamic nature of the interactions 
within it. The key issue for modelling is the capability in practice of 
representing this transport/economy system.  
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FIGURE 2: FROM TRANSPORT INTIATIVE TO NETWORK EFFECT 
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3.2  Modelling and appraisal in practice 
 
In principle tools exist to model all aspects of the transport-economy 
system. Transport behaviour models are well developed as are models of 
transport supply. Tools are now also available to model the interaction 
between land use and transport as well as linkages between the transport 
and the economic system - including both spatial computable general 
equilibrium models (SCGE) and transport macro-economic models. In 
practice, however, these tools are often applied in isolation or are only 
simply linked.  
 
Transport behaviour models are almost always used for project appraisal. 
However, often these are only coarsely linked to a public transport supply 
model if at all - even for sophisticated appraisals such as the UK multi-
modal studies (Bates et al, 2004) – and only rarely are they linked to either 
a land-use model or an economic model. When transport and economic 
models are linked it may often be in a simple manner that allows the 
models to converge but at the cost of preventing changes in the wider 
economy to be fed back into the transport market. This is the case for the 
link between the SCENES transport model and the CGEurope SCGE 
model (Bröcker et al, 2001) as used in the IASON project
2. 
 
                                            
2 IASON was an EC 5
th framework research project with the objective of improving the 
understanding of the impact of transportation policies on short- and long-term spatial development 
in the EU.  
  15Furthermore for technical, administrative and budgetary reasons the 
modelling and therefore the appraisal may be coarser than desired. 
Transport behaviour models with a large geographic scope may have only 
a weak representation of congestion due to a mixture of data availability 
issues or model run times. For example, the large zone sizes of the EU-
wide transport models SCENES, NEAC and VACLAV, reviewed as part of 
the IASON project, mean that short distance trips (intra-zonal trips) are 
excluded, thereby limiting the models’ abilities to replicate congestion 
effects (Laird et al, 2003). Networks may also be incomplete, so that there 
are effects outside the studied modes, areas and networks. This may arise 
for reasons of data acquisition costs, model complexity and computing 
power. In such situations the study area is cut down, the modelling system 
is simplified and elasticities are used to cover behavioural responses that 
are excluded from the analysis and to represent the generative effects of 
new infrastructure. Such elasticities may be rough and ready values or 
may even be set to zero. It is these practical restrictions which render the 
transport model incomplete and raise questions about how fully transport 
network effects are being picked up by the transport model. These 
questions become acute if networks are artificially truncated at regional or 
national boundaries. 
 
Moving to the transport-economy linkages, SCGE models are also in the 
infancy of their development and simplifications in the representation of 
labour markets, labour migration, household behaviour, the product 
market, the land market and the level of industrial disaggregation have to 
  16be made. CGEurope for example has only a weak representation of the 
labour market and the treatment of non-working time but a good 
representation of monopolistic competition and of economies of scale in 
the product market (Schade et al, 2004).  
 
From the economic evaluation perspective there are additional technical 
difficulties associated with placing an economic value on certain transport 
characteristics (e.g. reliability, congestion, overcrowding). 
 
Obviously, the further the modelling system falls short of ideal, the greater 
the potential for effects which are unmeasured within the appraisal (both 
positive and negative). It is therefore critical to the robustness of any 
appraisal that the most appropriate modelling tools are used, and any 
simplifications are considered carefully. For example, it may be 
unnecessary to develop a model of the wider economy for a transport 
infrastructure investment in which the majority of the network effects will 
be confined to the transport market. However, such a simplification would 
be questionable for a programme of investments that are focussed on the 
creation of new networks, such as the TEN-T programme, where network 
effects are expected in both the transport market and the wider economy.  
 
3.3  Network effects, total economic impact and economic appraisal 
 
By total economic impact, we mean simply the aggregate change in social 
welfare (see for example Mackie et al, 2001). If prices equal marginal 
  17social cost in the transport using sectors of the wider economy, then a full 
measure of total economic impact can be calculated from an analysis of 
impacts in the transport market (e.g. changes in travel times, travel 
demands and travel costs). Consequently, in that case, a good quality 
transport model with an appropriate transport supply and demand 
representation will provide a robust measure of total economic impact. 
This approach underpins transport cost benefit analysis (TCBA). 
 
The implications on total economic impact of a mis-specification of the 
TCBA can be significant. Van Exel et al (2002) cite three major 
infrastructure projects – the high speed rail link between Amsterdam and 
Paris, the freight rail link between Rotterdam and Antwerp and the 
expansion of Rotterdam harbour - where the artificial truncating of the 
TCBA to national borders excluded between 25% and 60% of the benefits 
of the projects. For projects at a more local level Beavis (2003) clearly 
identified the consequences of including or omitting certain interactions 
when appraising one trunk road improvement in the UK. Beavis found that 
exclusion of parts of the transport network from the TCBA could artificially 
inflate the Net Present Value (NPV) of the project by 37%. It is therefore 
clear from these two examples that exclusion of network effects that occur 
within the transport market from a TCBA, can either underestimate or 
overestimate the economic impact of a project. Laird et al (2003 see 
Annex 1) also demonstrate this but at a conceptual level. If the network or 
link that is excluded from the TCBA is congestible and is complementary 
to the new transport project, then the TCBA will overestimate the 
  18economic impact. If however the new transport infrastructure acts as a 
substitute for the excluded and congested part of the transport network 
then the TCBA will underestimate the economic impact. 
 
A ‘correct’ TCBA only provides a precise measure of total economic 
impact if prices equal marginal social costs. In reality prices may differ 
from marginal social costs because of, for example, the presence of 
spatial monopolies in the product markets and/or imperfect labour 
markets. If the transport investment leads to changes in demand for goods 
and labour, supplied through imperfect product and labour markets, 
welfare surpluses (and losses) occur that are additional to those measured 
in the transport market. In such a situation a complete calculation of total 
economic impact requires the inclusion of the transport/economy network 
effects addition to those that occur within the transport market. This 
calculation has to be undertaken in a manner that avoids double counting - 
for example by measuring the change in aggregate welfare at the 
household level in an SCGE model.  
 
Are these transport/economy network effects quantitatively significant? 
The first thing to note is that depending on market conditions the 
unaccounted elements of total economic impact when price does not 
equal marginal social costs may be positive or negative in sign (SACTRA, 
1999). In terms of the size of these unaccounted elements relative to 
those that are included in a TCBA the evidence is mixed. The theoretical 
work of Venables and Gasiorek (1999) found that if a transport project 
  19were able to reduce the cost mark-up on trade from 20% to 10% then the 
additional benefits compared to a TCBA could be in the region of 30%. 
Newbery’s review of their findings, however, indicates that the additional 
benefits need to be scaled down by a factor of 10 (Newbery, 1998; 
SACTRA, 1999). The SACTRA committee’s final comments indicate that 
they found additional benefits in the region of 6 to 12% plausible.  
 
Venables (2004) uses a SCGE model of a conceptual city economy, to 
demonstrate that including agglomeration effects on productivity in an 
economic appraisal could give rise to between 85% and 147% additional 
benefits for commuting journeys compared to a TCBA (for a 20% 
reduction in commute times). The range in results depends upon the 
assumption made regarding the impact of taxation. The increase in 
productivity stems from the consumption externalities associated with 
thicker labour markets, better input-output linkages and/or knowledge 
spillovers (i.e. agglomeration economies). Venables’ model does not 
explicitly model the consumption externalities but instead uses an 
empirically derived relationship between productivity and city size.  
 
There are unfortunately few examples in the literature of applications of 
SCGE models to real transport infrastructure projects. Oosterhaven and 
Elhorst (2003) used an SCGE model of the Netherlands that indicated 
additionality may range from -15% to +85% depending on the type and 
function of the new transport infrastructure. Crucially, unlike earlier work, 
their model includes an imperfectly competitive labour market. The 
  20additionality they found arises purely from the welfare implications of 
prices diverging from marginal social costs in the Dutch product and 
labour markets, with the imperfections in the labour market having the 
largest welfare implications. Projects which cool an overheated labour 
market by linking the periphery to the core gain significant additional 
benefits; whilst projects which contribute to further overheating lose 
benefits. 
 
With respect to the TEN-T network, the IASON research has indicated that 
implementation of the TEN-T priority projects may generate between 20% 
and 30% more economic benefit than would be measured in a normal 
TCBA (Bröcker et al, 2004). The nature of the CGEurope model used in 
this study means that these benefits primarily reflect the welfare 
consequences of prices diverging from marginal social costs in the goods 
(product) markets within the EU.  
 
As mentioned earlier SCGE models are in their infancy and whilst inroads 
have been made in their development and application to transport 
situations, there is still substantial scope for further development. The 
developmental nature of SCGE models is such that no model can yet 
simultaneously deal with imperfections in goods and labour markets, 
labour migration, economies of scale in production, agglomeration 
economies (resulting from consumption externalities) and the treatment of 
non-working time. This should be borne in mind when interpreting the 
SCGE model results.  
  21 
4 CONCLUSION 
 
Network effects in practical transport assessment are sometimes 
presented as an imprecise but desirable feature of infrastructure projects. 
This is dangerous: we need to pin the concept down if it is to be usable for 
policymakers. We define network effects as the second round 
reverberation effects on unit costs, prices and outputs in related markets . 
From the perspective of measuring total economic impact it can 
sometimes be useful to distinguish between transport network effects and 
those that appear in the wider economy. However, the interesting and 
unifying point about all network effects is that they arise as a consequence 
of one or more of the network properties: congestibility, economies of 
scale, scope or density or consumption externalities.  
 
Whether network effects are captured within models of the transport and 
economic system depends upon how well these models reflect the 
network properties identified above. The travel demand response 
properties of the system, and the evidence base for the set of elasticities 
and cross-elasticities in particular markets or corridors need to be 
strengthened particularly for projects that are expected to have significant 
generation effects. Current models are also weak in the link between 
demand and supply which determines service quality. For EU wide 
transport models, necessary for assessing TEN-T investments, the 
representation of congestion is also a weakness. With few exceptions, 
  22interactions between the transport system and the wider economy are not 
well represented if they are represented at all. 
 
Notwithstanding the practical issues of data, budgets and computing 
power, a good quality transport model fed by good data should be capable 
of picking up transport network effects for the vast majority of transport 
projects. Innovative transport modelling techniques may however be 
needed for transport projects in which the interaction between public 
transport supply and the travel demand model are important (e.g. a 
significant expansion of air and rail networks) or where large transport cost 
reductions are expected (e.g. connecting different regional or national 
economies by replacing ferry services with fixed links or providing a new 
pass through mountains). For network effects that appear in the wider 
economy, SCGE models linked to a good quality transport model appear 
promising tools for assessing large projects or programmes. However, 
much further empirical work, is needed before it can be considered that 
SCGE models can capture all forms of network effects that appear in the 
wider economy. 
 
Transport network effects can clearly be significant as shown by the 
evidence in section 3 of the paper. Therefore, a pre-requisite for a good 
quality fit for purpose appraisal of a major scheme or policy is a proper 
consideration of the second round impacts of the scheme on other modes, 
areas and sectors. Judging when the appraisal focus needs to be 
broadened to a wider area, perhaps across national boundaries, or from a 
  23unimodal to a multimodal focus, or to include the labour or goods markets, 
is very important. 
 
For projects that have significant impacts on connectivity, 
transport/economy network effects  will also be significant contributors to 
total economic impact. This is because it is in situations where connectivity 
is low that prices in the product and labour markets are likely to diverge 
most from marginal social costs and a step-change in connectivity is also 
likely to give rise to significant consumption externalities. At this time there 
is no definitive modelling system that captures all network effects, so the 
full scale of the economic impact of a project when price does not equal 
marginal social costs is not yet fully resolved. However, the evidence from 
the SCGE modelling work to date is that: the key drivers of the system are 
the labour market, the goods markets and agglomeration economies; the 
scale of the omitted effects on total economic impact is similar in size, at 
their most extreme, to a conventional estimate of total economic impact; 
and very importantly the omitted network effects may lower as well as 
raise a conventional estimate of total economic impact.  
 
So, network effects are not an infallible magic potion for breathing life into 
underperforming infrastructure projects. If network effects that appear in 
the wider economy (e.g. changes in output and employment) are 
considered a crucial argument in infrastructure decisions, careful 
economic analysis of their strength and significance on a case by case 
basis should be made. 
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